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SURVIVING SPOUSE'S DISTRIBUTIVE SHARE OF
AMENDABLE TRUSTS
Purcell v. Cleveland Trust Co.
200 N.E.2d 602,28 Ohio Op. 2d 262 (P. Ct. 1964)
Approximately three years before her death in 1960, plaintiff's wife
created an amendable and revocable inter vivos trust, naming defendant
as trustee. The formally drawn instrument provided for pour-over from
her simultaneously executed will, however, a specific bequest to the trust
was apparently never made. After his wife's death, plaintiff, choosing to ex-
ercise his statutory prerogative of taking against his wife's will,' demanded
that defendant trustee pay over to him from the corpus of the inter vivos
trust the one-half share which he claimed was due him under Ohio law.
Upon the trustee's refusal to accede, plaintiff brought an action in the
Probate Court of Cuyahoga County asking for a declaratory judgment
establishing his right to receive a distributive share from the trust corpus.
The court sustained the right of plaintiff to one-half of the fund by virtue
of his election to take against the will.2
This decision adds no certainty to an area of Ohio law long typified
by uncertainty. Prior to 1921 an inter vivos trust was void unless the
donor indicated an intention to part absolutely with dominion and control
over, or benefit from, the property.3 In that year an amendment to section
86174 of the General Code altered the effect of that section to permit the
creation of trusts with substantial reservations of control and benefit in
the settlor. The amendment was not greeted enthusiastically by the courts.
In Union Trust Co. v. Hawkins5 the Ohio Supreme Court initially ex-
pressed grave doubts concerning the wisdom of the legislation and was
reluctant to interpret the amended statute as anything more than a restate-
1 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2107.39 (Page 1954).
2 Purcell v. Cleveland Trust Co., 200 N.E2d 602, 28 Ohio Op. 2d 262 (P. Ct.
1964).
3 Worthington v. Redkey, 86 Ohio St. 128, 99 N.E. 211 (1912), found in the
reservations of control or benefit a showing that the donor lacked the intent to part
with the legal title. Failure to transfer the title was held to render the dispositions
provided by the trust testamentary and therefore invalid unless the trust document
was formally executed in compliance with the Statute of Wills.
4 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1335.01 (Page Supp. 1964):
All deeds of gifts and conveyances of real or personal property made in trust
for the exclusive use of the person making the same are void, but the creator
of a trust may reserve to himself any use of power, beneficial or in trust,
which he might lawfully grant to another, including the power to alter,
amend, or revoke such trust, and such trust is valid as to all persons [except
creditors who may reach reserved beneficial interests or compel revocation
if the power to revoke is reserved.]
Prior to its amendment the statute (29 Ohio Laws 218 § 1 (1810)) read sub-
stantially the same as the present version up to the first comma.
5 121 Ohio St. 159, 167 N.E. 389 (1929).
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ment of the old rule. The court's misgivings apparently stemmed from fears
that legalization of trusts for the use of the settlor would lead to their
widespread use as a means of circumventing the fraud-preventive formal-
ities of the Statute of Wills." However, on rehearing the court accepted the
more radical interpretation of the amendment noting that it was probably
the one intended by the legislature and that it was, indeed, the only one
which would "give the amendment any intelligent or practical application."7
Later, in a case involving a trust which was established prior to the
effective date of the amendment and was therefore not governed by it, the
court repudiated the notion set out in Hawkins that the new legislation was
the sole available authority to support its upholding the trust.8 Moving
into concord with the bulk of authority elsewhere, the court held that the
gift in praesenti of an equitable interest (the legal interest vesting simul-
taneously in a trustee) is not invalid because some control and benefit is
retained by the donor. Naturally the present transfer of interests must
actually take place, and the court warned that if the retained powers were
too extensive, no transfer would be presumed-instead the trustee in such
case would be regarded as a mere agent of the donor. The facts in each
individual case are therefore crucial in determining the validity of an al-
leged trust.9
Subsequent cases increased the degree of permissible control by the
donor to the level of almost complete dominion.'0 The validity of the trust
litigated in Schofield v. Cleveland Trust Co." was sustained even though
the donor had relinquished almost no control or benefit. 12 Thus emerged an
interpretation of the amendment evincing judicial confidence in and sup-
port of revocable, amendable trusts as valid gifts which, despite their
qualified nature, vest a present interest in the donee.'8 By conditioning
recognition of such a trust on presentation of clear and convincing evidence
of its establishment, the likelihood of fraud had been alleviated and the
original conflict with the Statute of Wills had thus been resolved, or at
least rationalized.' 4
6 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2107.03 (Page 1954).
7 Union Trust Co. v. Hawkins, supra note 5, at 180, 167 N.E. at 395.
8 Cleveland Trust Co. v. White, 134 Ohio St. 1, 15 N.E2d 627 (1938).
9 Id. at 9-10, 15 N.E2d at 630.
10 Schofield v. Cleveland Trust Co., 135 Ohio St. 328, 21 N.E2d 119 (1939);
Central Trust Co. v. Watt, 139 Ohio St. 50, 38 N.E2d 185 (1941). In the latter case
a three-judge minority opined that the "trustee" was in reality a mere agent of the
donor, i.e., no valid trust was created.
1 Supra note 10.
12 The donor retained, among other things, the right to income from the property,
the right to insist that his approval of sales and purchases of property be obtained,
and the right to revoke the arrangement.
'3 See First Nat'l Bank v. Tenney, 165 Ohio St. 513, 138 N.E2d 15 (1956).
14 Adams v. Fleck, 171 Ohio St. 451, 172 N.E2d 126 (1961). The court ex-
pressly did not hold that a formal document would be singularly capable of providing
the clear and convincing evidence required to establish the terms of the trust agree-
ment, although it noted that such a document has always been present in the past. See
1 Scott, Trusts § 57.2 (2d ed. Supp. 1960).
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Parallel to the development of this line of cases supporting the revo-
cable, amendable trust, two cases, Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co.15 and Harris
v. Harris,16 were decided in which the court refused to respect the finality
of contributions to trusts if those contributions depleted the estate from
which the spouse's statutory share was to be derived. To permit such gifts
seemed to amount to a fraud on the spouse. Evasion of the Statute of Wills
via these trusts was bad enough, but emasculation of the election statute
was intolerable. Invasion of the corpus of an established inter vivos trust
to permit the spouse to recover her statutory share thereof was ordered.
In Bolles the court decided that the statute authorizing revocable, amend-
able trusts1 7 had no effect on the rights of a spouse in the decedent's estate.
That the purpose of the statute was to alter traditional policies in this re-
gard was dismissed without comment.' 8 The trust was considered to be
otherwise valid; no "mere" agency was created. The result was a strange
phenomenon: property of which the deceased had divested himself during
his lifetime appeared in the bands of his administrator for distribution to
his spouse, while ownership of the property remained wholly in the intended
donees, i.e., the trustee and the beneficiary. Three years later in Harris the
principles enunciated in Bolles were again applied, though this time with
only a bare majority concurring. 19
Recently the court has again seemed inclined to favor and support
revocable, amendable trusts,2 0 a trend which has culminated with Smyth
v. Cleveland Trust Co. 2 1 in which that portion of Bolles which authorized
the invasion of an inter vivos trust to obtain a statutory share thereof was
expressly overruled. Now one possessed of virtually all incidents of owner-
ship at death may, by taking the proper steps, dispose of that property
upon his death so as to put it absolutely beyond reach of his spouse.2 2 It
is true that the plaintiff spouse in Smyth was otherwise generously provided
for; preserving the trust would not have left her penniless, and indeed, she
willingly participated in transfers of realty to the trust,23 which facts negate
implications of fraud or unsavory motives on the part of the deceased. It
does not seem, however, that the case rested on such equitable considera-
15 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E2d 381 (1944).
16 147 Ohio St. 437, 72 N.E.2d 378 (1947).
17 Supra note 4.
18 144 Ohio St. at 213, 58 N.E2d at 391.
19 See in particular the dissenting opinion of Zimmerman, J., who anticipated
future doctrine. 147 Ohio St. at 446, 72 N.E2d at 382.
20 First Nat'l Bank v. Tenney, supra note 13; Adams v. Fleck, supra note 14.
21 172 Ohio St. 489, 179 N.E.2d 60 (1961).
22 He may apparently do it even for the express purpose of depriving his spouse
of his bounty, although a good faith intent to effect an actual transfer must be present.
Some care must be taken to clarify this intent, for where bad faith regarding the
spouse is evident, the courts have been disposed to call the transfer a sham, the intent
to make a gift not being present. See Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966
(1937).
23 Smyth v. Cleveland Trust Co., supra note 21 at 502-03, 179 N.E2d at 69.
[Vol. 25
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
tions.24 Nor does the fact that the trust was executed on a formal document,
also mentioned as a makeweight by the court, seem to have been crucial
to its decision.25 Controlling, rather, was the court's considered revaluation
of the amended statute.
The effect of the doctrine of independent significance is to dispel the
cloud of invalidity which would otherwise surround a bequest made to an
amendable, revocable inter vivos trust where the terms or beneficiaries of
the trust were later changed. Hence, the disposition of testamentary prop-
erty may be altered subsequent to the formal execution of the will without
the formality of executing a new will or codicil. 26 The rationale seems to
be that such acts are independently significant in that they also affect the
disposition of the property comprising the inter vivos trust. If the variation
of the future state of things is accompanied by a variation in the present
state of things, the difficulty of perpetrating fraud will be enhanced.
Until 1963, no clear-cut authority supporting application of the doctrine
of independent significance to trusts existed in Ohio,27 but in that year the
General Assembly enacted a statute giving it formal legislative approval. 28
The statute provided that its terms were not to have the effect of qualifying
the right of a surviving spouse to the statutory share of the testator's estate;
that is, a bequest to an inter vivos trust is, like all other bequests, subject
to the rights of the surviving spouse. A probable moving force behind
enactment of the statute was fear that the rule of the recently decided
Smyth case would be extended to legacies to established inter vivos trusts,
24 It has been suggested that equitable considerations may play a fairly impor-
tant determinative role. See generally 23 Ohio St. L.J. 581 (1962).
25 The court did feel that the formality was helpful in determining that a trust,
not a mere agency, had been created, perhaps again echoing the predisposition to
substitute for the fraud-discouraging provisions of the Statute of Wills only measures
which themselves have some "fraud-proofing" built in.
26 See generally 1 Scott, Trusts § 54.3 (2d ed. 1956).
27 In Bolles the court, noting the doctrine's unacceptability in some other jurisdic-
tions, intimated that such a case "may" come up in Ohio, though it concluded that
Bolles was not it. Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., supra note 15, at 215-16, 58 N.E2d at
391.
28 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2107.63 (Page Supp. 1964):
A testator may by will devise, bequeath, or appoint real or personal property,
or any interest in such property, to a trustee of a trust which is evidenced by
a written instrument executed by the testator or any other person either be-
fore or on the same date of the execution of such will and which is identified
in such will.
The property or interest.., shall be added to and become a part of the trust
estate, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the court having jurisdiction of
such trust, and shall be administered in accordance with the terms and pro-
visions of the instrument creating such trust, including, unless the will spe-
cifically provides otherwise, any amendments or modifications thereof made
in writing before, concurrently with, or after the maling of the will and
prior to the death of the testator....
This section shall not affect any of the rights accorded to a surviving spouse
[by the election statute] ....
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barring the right of the spouse to the bequest as well as the corpus. At any
rate, the apparent meaning of the statute is to proscribe such extension.
The facts-of the instant case are essentially the same as those of Smyth,
on whose authority one would expect it to be decided. The probate court,
however, in dissatisfaction with the abandonment of Bolles, concluded that
the newly enacted statute concerning independent significance represented
a legislative overruling of Smyth to the extent that it modified Bolles. By
interpreting the enactment as an abrogation of Smyth, a justification was
found to apply what was felt to be the more acceptable rule. But only prop-
erty originally transferred to the trust inter vivos seems to be subject to
adjudication here,29 while the statute apparently deals only with testamen-
tary property, stipulating that it may be lawfully bequeathed to an amend-
able trust. No intention to affect the rules governing inter vivos arrange-
ments is apparent. The ironic result is that the court, in allowing the
invasion of the inter vivos created corpus, seems to have confounded the
laws regarding inter vivos vis-A-vis testamentary transfers of property by
uncommonly interpreting the statute calculated decisively to distinguish the
two. Rather than blocking extension of the Smyth rule to preclude the
spouse's rights against the decedent's estate, the statute has been used in
the instant case as a conduit for regression to the pre-Smyth rule.
29 It was not made entirely clear in the opinion whether or not testamentary
gifts to the trust were included in the corpus. However, it is certain that even if there
were any, there was most assuredly inter vivos property included with it and treated
by the court as indistinguishable from it. The presence of pour over from the will
should not affect the disposition of the inter vivos gifts in any case.
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